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courts, generally limit requests for evidence to material that has already been exhibited. If a court decision is required-in most instances various forms of accommodation make it unnecessary-the
court will balance the uniqueness and need for the evidence against
a presumption that the media need to preserve their news-gathering
role.
In other areas Japanese law reflects features of their culture
that differ from ours. Thus Japan, probably uniquely among democratic societies, forbids political canvassing. This is partly because
of a tradition of repression of popular mobilization, but it is also due
to the fact that a visit by strangers to a house has quite different
connotations-sometimes of threat, sometimes of obligation-in
that society. Similarly, the serious Japanese attitude toward affiliations and the obligations they entail makes associational democracy
complex and different; even assassination of those attempting to
leave a party remains a familiar event in recent history.
What is striking is the extent to which there has emerged in
Japan a societal impulse toward liberty, building upon historic
foundations such as media efforts to be free and independent even
under the repression that once prevailed. Trickier, but already
partly successful, has been the taming and legitimization of older
traditions of resistance-violent demonstrations and strikes-into
more limited forms of approved behavior. The process by which so
much has occurred in four decades has been complex. We are most
fortunate to have so sensitive and careful a chronicler and analyst as
Professor Beer. His admirable book will be valued for a long time.
It may also help to strengthen the trends it so trenchantly describes.

SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS:
CASES, READINGS, AND TEXT. By Wallace D. Loh.1
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1984. Pp. xxix, 778.
$37.50.
Robert L. Nelson 2

This book is an impressive contribution to the study of constitutional change. It can be recommended both as a source book for
scholars of constitutional history and as a text for courses in law
I. Professor of Law, Adjunct Appointment with the Department of Psychology, University of Washington.
2. Project Director, American Bar Foundation; Research Sociologist, Northwestern
University School of Law.
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and social science. The book is impressive not so much for the insights the author provides into the process of constitutional adjudication or the role that social science has played in the process, as for
the scope of the materials collected. Chapter by chapter it documents the increasing tendency of the courts to refer to empirical
research in deciding constitutional issues. In many significant areas
of constitutional change over the last thirty years, including school
desegregation, the death penalty, illegal searches and seizures, and
various aspects of the selection and functioning of juries, the courts
have consulted, if not relied on, the findings of social research.
Professor Lob's principal purpose in assembling these materials was to develop a textbook for students interested in the role of
social research in the judicial process - mostly graduate students
in the social sciences. Nevertheless, I think it will be of more interest to constitutional scholars, and not too unfair to Professor Loh,
to evaluate his text as a source of questions about the role of social
research in constitutional adjudication. What accounts for the increasing use of social science in constitutional cases? How has it
been used by the courts and what has been its impact? What will be
the rule of social research in future constitutional decisions? How
adequately has Professor Loh addressed these issues through his
choice of cases and readings and the comments that accompany
them?
I

In the introduction Loh explains that his book is mostly about
the role that social research has played in the law. Accordingly,
policy studies are more prominent than general theory. Yet he
takes care to describe the historical context of the opinions and research findings. This not only establishes continuity in the text, but
also provides the reader with a sense of the big picture that Loh
seems to eschew in the introduction.
The book is organized in four parts. Part I is introductory and
gives a general overview of the judicial process. While useful to
students without legal training, much of this material can be skipped by more sophisticated readers. The guts of the work come in
parts II and III, which deal respectively with social research in the
appellate process and the trial process. Part IV is a historical, conceptual, and jurisprudential afterword on the preceding sections.
The substantive portion of the text begins with two comprehensive and interesting chapters on school desegregation. Here, as
in the other substantive chapters, Loh describes the historical context: the enactment of the civil war amendments, the rise of Jim
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Crow legislation, and the restrained posture taken by the federal
courts in the early segregation cases. Reprinting substantial portions of the P/essy opinion, he suggests the impact on P/essy of
Herbert Spencer's Social Darwinism and other theories of innate
racial differences. The text then documents how the accepted view
of racial differences began to shift as research by Boas, Klineberg,
and Myrdal assaulted the biological theories. The NAACP began
to use social research in its efforts to overturn Plessy. The chapter
includes the celebrated appendix to appellants' brief in Brown,
which summarized the opinions of social scientists on the effects of
segregated schooling on blacks and whites, as well as excerpts from
the trial testimony of expert witnesses in the South Carolina, Virginia, and Kansas cases. The full text of the Brown opinion is followed by Edmond Cahn's attack on the famous footnote 11, in
which Cahn criticizes the opinion for appearing to rest on the
"flimsy foundation" of the social science evidence presented. Psychologist Kenneth Clark, who coordinated the efforts of social
scientists for the NAACP and whose doll studies were cited by the
Court, responds. Clark argues that the social science evidence was
relevant to the question before the Court and that Cahn's criticism
reflects a lawyer's bias that courts should make decisions in isolation from other bodies of intellectual and scientific knowledge. The
chapter concludes by stepping back from the Brown case in a section on the Brandeis brief and its role in Muller v. Oregon.
In true casebook form, the cases and readings are followed by
detailed notes and questions that add supplementary information
and draw out the analysis of the cases. Interspersed among the
readings are brief statements on elements of constitutional interpretation, such as the differences in the standards of review courts apply in judging the constitutionality of legislation. This commentary
was written with care, but its primary value will be to nonlawyers.
As Professor Loh himself recognizes, there is the danger that the
novice will come away from these summaries with an excessively
simplistic sense of the law.
Chapter four examines the cases and research since the first
Brown opinion, including Brown II, Swann v. CharlotteMecklenberg, and Milliken, as well as the findings of the original
Coleman report, Coleman's reversal on desegregation based on his
studies of white flight, and conflicting studies concerning the effect
of desegregation on academic achievement, self-concept, and race
relations. Loh summarizes the different perspectives on the rights
and remedies identified in Brown and later cases as "input," "output," and "throughput" perspectives. The input perspective treats
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Brown as identifying the right not to be subject to intentional discrimination. The output perspective interprets Brown as guaranteeing equal outcomes in the quality of education received by different
groups, without regard to intentional discrimination. The
throughput perspective treats the case as mandating remedial educational programs for disadvantaged groups, but according to Loh
this perspective is unclear about the nature of the violations (if any)
that trigger the provision of remedial programs.
Lob's typology, the readings selected, and the comments that
accompany the text may confuse those who do not understand the
constitutional analysis of the post-Brown cases. The materials imply that judicial orders to desegregate systems are in some sense
contingent on finding that desegregation has tangible positive effects
on minorities. While evidence about the impact of desegregation on
educational quality and race relations may well influence the Justices, and even though the remedy in Milliken II requires expenditures by the Detroit School Board and the State of Michigan to
improve educational quality, the gravamen of a constitutional violation remains the finding of purposeful discrimination by the authorities of a particular jurisdiction. The most vexing issue in recent
post-Brown cases has been whether racial imbalances in schools are
traceable to governmental discrimination or merely reflect the familiar pattern of racially segregated housing.
The chapter on the aftermath of Brown concludes with materials on discrimination against minorities by school administrators
and employers. Social science evidence played an important role in
cases alleging that the use of I.Q. tests to assign students to remedial
classes had invidious effects on the educational opportunities of minorities. But the outcomes of the cases have varied. The chapter
reprints Judge Peckham's opinion finding a constitutional violation
in the use of the tests in California; similar evidence was not persuasive to a federal district court examining the practices of the Chicago Board of Education. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Griggs and Albemarle, has
generated similar issues concerning the validity and impact of testing procedures in the context of employment discrimination. A
striking aspect of litigation involving expert testimony concerning
discrimination, which is suggested in Judge Peckham's analysis, is
the enormous discretion that trial judges exercise when interpreting
conflicting data. The results of such cases typically hinge on quite
arbitrary and unpredictable standards for drawing (or refusing to
draw) inferences from the data.
In chapter five Loh takes up the death penalty cases. He re-
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prints the most significant constitutional decisions, from Witherspoon to Furman to Gregg and its progeny, as well as the empirical
studies about the issues in the cases. With few exceptions (for example, the Hovey case, in which the California Supreme Court revised voir dire procedures in capital cases), the decisions have not
rested on empirical research. Wolfgang's dramatic findings on the
discriminatory application of the death penalty to black convicts in
selected counties in Arkansas were not persuasive in an appeal by a
black convicted in a different Arkansas county. According to the
court of appeals, the study was not probative because it had not
analyzed the particular county and the particular jury involved in
the case. Similarly, when confronting the question of the deterrent
effect of capital punishment in Gregg, the Supreme Court found the
statistical studies "inconclusive."
Chapter six differs from the previous chapters in that it emphasizes almost exclusively the impact of court decisions on society
rather than the impact of social research on decisions. The chapter
deals with the rulings on the interrogation of suspects and searches
and seizures. The Miranda opinion, reprinted here, rests on a skeptical conception of police interrogation, but does not rely on empirical evidence to validate that conception. It was only after Miranda
that Skolnick and others began to examine empirically the Court's
assumptions, as well as the likely impact of the procedural rules
that the Justices laid down. Similarly, Mapp started an enduring
debate over the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule. Despite
a substantial body of research, studies of the rule have produced
conflicting and unpersuasive claims.3 Drawing heavily on
Skolnick's Justice Without Trial, 4 the chapter examines how the organization of the police affects the implementation of rules designed
to control police behavior.
The focal point of the four chapters in part Ill is the jury.
Chapter seven analyzes the selection of juries, covering jury discrimination cases, the techniques of scientific jury selection, and the
impact of pretrial publicity on juror partiality. Chapter eight
presents the cases and research dealing with jury size-the issue on
which social science has had its most direct effect on constitutional
decisions. Following the decision in Williams v. Florida, in which
the Supreme Court approved six-person juries in criminal cases,
there was an outpouring of research on the effect of jury size. When
3. See generally Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)
About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"
Arrests, 1983 AM. BAR. FOUND. RES. J. 611-90.
4. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY (1966).
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a five-person jury was challenged eight years later in Ballew v. Georgia, the Court reversed itself, citing the jury research. Chapter nine
contains studies of the effect of different evidence rules on jury decisionmaking, including the order in which parties present evidence,
modes of presenting evidence, and the use of probability estimates
at trial. Chapter ten deals with eyewitness identification.
Lob reserved the broadest set of readings for the last part of
the book, on the theory that students could better deal with such
generalities after exposure to specific case materials. After a chapter summarizing the history of psycholegal research, and the recurrent tensions between lawyers and social scientists, Lob reviews
major jurisprudential theories about the judicial process: formalist,
realist, and purposive reasoning. The chapter contains some classic
essays from Fuller, Holmes, and Llewellyn, woven together with a
description of the historical forces leading to the rise of different
schools of American jurisprudence, from the scientific analysis of
cases initiated by Langdell, to Pound and later the realists, to the
emergence after World War II of the reasoned elaboration school,
followed by Dworkin's natural rights model. The final chapter addresses when and how social research should be used in the judicial
process. It replays a debate over whether the courts should rely on
social science in reaching decisions, as well as Harry Kalven's essay
on searching for the "middle ground" in social research on the law,
that is, for empirical research that has a realistic possibility of affecting significant legal issues. After considering some of the obstacles to interdisciplinary efforts between lawyers and social scientists,
Lob concludes on a realistic but upbeat note. Social science can
seldom solve legal problems, and certainly cannot displace the act
of judging. Such hopes necessarily invite disillusionment with the
effort. But social research can inform judicial decisions and make
them more responsible.
II
What then does Lob's book tell us about why social research
has become decidedly more prominent in constitutional adjudication? The first place to look is at the courts themselves. The expanding use of social science is tied in part to changes in the
questions addressed by courts, the nature of federalism, and modes
of judicial analysis. First, it is only relatively recently that appellate
courts have defined constitutional issues in a way that regularly
makes complicated questions of fact and policy relevant to the outcome. The Supreme Court's reference in Muller to Brandeis's brief
was a poignant moment in this historical progression. For in
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Muller, the first systematic attempt to use social research in the
Supreme Court, Brandeis sought only to persuade the Justices that
the maximum hours law had a reasonable police power rationale.
He did not claim that the law was necessarily wise-although of
course that was the implication of his evidence-only that it was
sufficiently reasonable to pass constitutional muster. Today, many
feminists would view Muller in a different light; they would call the
law, limited as it was to women, unjust sex discrimination.s They
would dismiss Brandeis's brief as a reflection of paternalistic ideology rather than objective science.
Brandeis and his allies sought to encourage judicial restraint.
In contrast, the more recent and dramatic expansion of the role of
social research came in the post-Brown era, as the Supreme Court
expanded the meaning of due process and equal protection, and
thus asserted its position as a national policymaking body. It was
only after the decision that de jure segregation was unconstitutional
that the courts had to confront questions about the causes of de
facto segregation in housing and schools. It was only through the
progressive incorporation of the Bill of Rights that questions about
the deterrent effects of the exclusionary rule, discrimination in the
selection of juries, and the coerciveness of custodial interrogation
were presented to federal courts.
Shifting theories of federalism contributed significantly to the
rise of social science in the judicial process by expanding the role of
the federal judiciary. I suppose that federal courts are generally far
more likely to entertain social scientific expertise than are state
courts. First, federal judges are on the average more sophisticated
than state judges, and consequently more receptive to academic expertise. Besides, the state judiciary is more intimately connected
with local politics and the local judiciary. It is more likely to rely
on its intuitions about local conditions and trial judges than on social science evidence.
Finally, changes in the structure of federalism accompanied
the rise of a purposive jurisprudence in which courts began to engage more openly in policy analysis in the course of reaching constitutional decisions. As the courts moved away from more
traditional legal modes of analysis, factual premises became critical
to the legitimacy of decisions. (A judge relying on precedent or an
authoritative text can be oracular; but one relying on "sound policy" needs evidence.) Social science became one means by which
the courts could rationalize their decisions on seemingly objective,
politically neutral grounds. It will be interesting to observe whether
5.

See generally Bryden, Brandeis's Facts, 1 CONST. COMM. 281 (1984).
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this pattern changes in the opinions of the politically conservative
appointees of the Reagan administration. If the federal judiciary
returns to formalist reasoning, social research may become less important. The new judges may, however, change the substance of the
law without changing the style of decisionmaking.
The changing importance of social research cannot be explained solely by reference to the courts. Without the growth of the
social sciences since World War II, and the increasing methodological sophistication of social research, the social sciences would have
had little to offer the courts. Moreover, there has been a steady
expansion of socio-legal scholarship. Interdisciplinary associations
have thrived since the late 1960's. An increasing number of social
scientists have built research programs around the policy questions
articulated by the courts. The cases on the constitutionally permissible size of juries, Williams and Ballew, are an excellent example of
how a specific empirical question of constitutional import can generate a substantial body of social research within a short time.
Do these trends signal the emergence of a powerful role for
social scientists in constitutional adjudication? I think not. Even in
cases that rest on relatively narrow questions amenable to social research, the courts have often been unable to interpret social science
evidence correctly or unwilling to change traditional procedures in
light of the empirical findings. In the cases on jury size to which I
alluded above, for example, the Supreme Court's analysis was riddled with technical errors.6 Moreover, even though much of the
research cited in Ballew attacked six-person juries, the Court refused to reconsider its earlier opinion on the propriety of such juries. Another glaring example that Loh documents concerns
eyewitness testimony. Despite a long history of psycholegal research raising questions about the reliability of eyewitness testimony, the police and courts continue to rely heavily on such
evidence. The moral seems to be that when social science conflicts
with the longstanding traditions of the law, judges resist change.
In controversial fields experts usually divide along ideological
lines. Loh's materials are replete with examples of such splits
among groups of social scientists. It is no wonder that Kenneth
Clark, the leader of the social scientists in the Brown case, felt a
sense of betrayal when social scientists began to question the benefits of school desegregation. Shortly after Brown Clark had claimed
that "proof [of the wrongfulness of segregation] had to come from
the social psychologists." Twenty years later he found social scien6. Kave, And Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning, the Supreme Court, and
the Size of the Jury, 68 CAL. L. REv. 1004 (1980).
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tists to be "no more dependable in the quest for social justice than
other citizens.... [and] primarily responsive to majority fashion,
prejudices, and power." What had happened, of course, was that
the issue of de jure Southern segregation had been replaced by the
issue of "school busing," a much more controversial question in the
academy.
Judges often are left to pick and choose among conflicting
opinions to justify their decisions, or, as the Supreme Court did in
the exclusionary rule and capital punishment cases, to ignore the
social scientific findings as hopelessly inconclusive. The level of dissensus in the scholarly community is no doubt disconcerting to lawyers and social scientists alike. It means that there is no objective
science of society to which the courts can tum. Social research cannot rescue the courts from the dilemma of how to make political
judgments in a principled fashion.

CHOOSING ELITES: SELECTING THE "BEST AND
THE BRIGHTEST" AT TOP UNIVERSITIES AND
ELSEWHERE. By Robert Klitgaard.' New York: Basic
Books. 1985. Pp. 267. $19.95.
Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr. 2
In his Bakke opinion, Justice Lewis Powell presented the admission process at Harvard College as a model worthy of
emulation:
The experience of other university admission programs, which take race into account in achieving the educational diversity valued by the First Amendment, demonstrates that the assignment of a fixed number of places to a minority group is not
a necessary means toward that end. An illuminating example is found in the
Harvard College program. 3

A consensus as to the merits of the Harvard model was, however, not achieved by the Justices. Justice Harry Blackmun argued,
"I am not convinced, as Mr. Justice Powell seems to be, that the
difference between the Davis program and the one employed by
Harvard is very profound or constitutionally significant. The line
between the two is a thin and indistinct one. In each, subjective
application is at work."4
I.
2.

3.
4.

Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University.
Professor of Psychology, University of Minnesota.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,316 (1978).
/d. at 406.

